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This article examines the phenomenon of jihadist groups operating in the Afghanistan-Pa-
kistan borderlands and argues that the political chaos that reigns in Kabul is contributing to 
the growth of jihadism in Afghanistan. The administration of Kabul is losing its grip on the 
security situation and Afghanistan is once again on the brink of an abyss. The future of vari-
ous jihadist groups, be they the Taliban, ISIS, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan operating on Af-
ghan soil or other smaller groups, appears promising. On the other hand, the prognosis for 
the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands and the civilian populations living in the rugged and 
restless region appears bleak. The vicious cycle of violence continues and the entrenched 
jihadist groups revel in the chaos caused by the failure of central governments on both sides 
of the border to establish the rule of law and provide services for the local populations. It ap-
pears that the borderlands that have always been beyond the control of central governments 
will continue to be ungoverned spaces for a long time to come.
Keywords: Afghanistan, jihadism, Taliban, ISIS, Pakistan.
* Much of the material presented in this article is based on the author’s work and experiences in 
various parts of Afghanistan between the years 2003 and 2017.
Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2018. Т. 11. Вып. 4 335
The British were beginning to understand that Afghani-
stan was no easy place to rule. In the last two millennia there 
had been only very brief moments of strong central control 
when the different tribes had acknowledged the authority of 
a single ruler, and still briefer moments of anything approach-
ing a unified political system. It was in many ways less a state 
than a kaleidoscope of competing tribal principalities gov-
erned through maliks or vakils, in each of which allegiance 
was entirely personal, to be negotiated and won over rather 
than taken for granted. The tribe’s traditions were egalitarian 
and independent, and they only ever submitted to authority 
on their own terms. Financial rewards might bring about co-
operation, but rarely ensured loyalty: the individual Afghan 
soldier owed his allegiance first to the local chieftain who 
raised and paid him, not to the Durrani shahs in faraway 
Kabul or Peshawar (excerpt from Return of a King) [1, p. 25].
Introduction
The rugged, remote and mountainous Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands constitute 
a buffer zone between the administrations in Kabul and Islamabad. The majority of the 
population of the borderlands are Pashtun, and most are Sunni Muslims belonging to the 
Hanafi Islamic school of law. The intricate tapestry of tribes, subtribes, clans and social or-
ders of the borderlands has remained the principal source of identification and allegiance 
among the people. Identities and group interests are highly local, and often associated 
with a village, or a clan. 
In terms of cultural affiliation, the Pashtun resemble the warrior nomads of the Cen-
tral Asian plains more than the agriculturalists of southern Pakistan. Customary law is 
intertwined with a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. Freedom from interference by 
outsiders is highly valued and independence is fiercely defended. This is especially true 
with respect to foreigners and non-Muslims, who are often referred to as infidels and must 
be fought against in the name of Allah.
This article examines the phenomenon of jihadist groups operating in the Afghani-
stan-Pakistan borderlands and argues that the political chaos that reigns in Kabul is con-
tributing to the growth of jihadism in Afghanistan. The administration in Kabul is losing 
its grip on the security situation and Afghanistan is once again on the brink of an abyss. 
The future of the various jihadist groups, be they the Taliban, ISIS1, Tehrik-e Taliban Pa-
kistan operating on Afghan soil or other smaller groups, appears promising. The vicious 
cycle of violence continues and the entrenched jihadist groups revel in the chaos caused by 
the failure of central governments on both sides of the border to establish the rule of law 
and provide services for the local populations. The article concludes with the contention 
that the borderlands that have always been beyond the control of central governments will 
continue to be ungoverned spaces for a long time to come. 
A line on the map
The conflict-ridden modern history of the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands began 
when the British drew the Durand Line in 1893 to demarcate the 2,430-kilometre bor-
der between Afghanistan and British India. The artificial pen stroke divided the Pashtun 
1 Taliban, ISIS — extremist organizations, prohibited in Russia.
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into two separate countries. With the creation of modern Pakistan in 1948, Islamabad 
inherited the Durand Line, and the status of the border has been a constant source of dis-
pute and tension between the administrations in Kabul and Islamabad. However, the local 
Pashtun tribes have never acknowledged the existence of the border and cross it at will. 
In a study of the Central Asian and Afghan borderland, Parham argues that life in a state’s 
border region is closely entwined with life within the two neighbouring states simultane-
ously rather than in just one state: networks snake back and forth across borders, econom-
ic exchange makes use of the borderline, and neighbouring political systems influence 
domestic policy [2]. This line of argumentation also applies very aptly to the Afghanistan-
Pakistan borderlands.
The area on the Pakistani side of the border is referred to as FATA or the Feder-
ally Administered Tribal Area. FATA is composed of seven autonomous areas: Khyber, 
Mohmand, Bajaur, Kurram, Orakzai, and Northern and Southern Waziristan. All the 
aforementioned areas are adjacent to the Afghanistan and Pakistan border except for 
Orakzai. In addition, six other areas are considered to be parts of what are called the 
Frontier Regions.
On the Afghan side of the border there are ten provinces, which include Badak-
shan, Nuristan, Kunar, Nangahar, Paktiya, Logar, Khost, Paktika, Zaul and Kandahar. The 
Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands are renowned for opium production and smuggling. 
There are many mobile laboratories found in the area where opium is processed into her-
oin to be smuggled into Russia, Europe and China (see [3] for a thorough analysis of the 
drug trade).
The Khyber Pass connects Afghanistan’s Jalalabad with Pakistan’s Peshawar. It is the 
only major border crossing between the two countries. The Macedonians, Persians, Scyth-
ians, Mongols and Afghans traversed the 50-kilometre-long rocky pass. In the 19th cen-
tury the British army guarded the restless border in the Khyber Pass.
The borderlands can be thought of as a shatter zone where the ambitions of outsid-
ers have always been shattered. For example, during the heyday of ISAF (International 
Security Assistance Force), almost 70 percent of the casualties were from Kunar province. 
War correspondent Sebastian Junger’s documentary War is situated in Kunar’s Korengal 
Valley, where the Americans fought a futile battle against a relentless and tough enemy [4]. 
On the Pakistan side of the border, the writ of Islamabad has always been weak. In 
fact, the tribal areas do not even fall under the jurisdiction of Pakistan’s constitution. 
Rather, these areas are governed through the Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1901, which 
is a legacy of the British Empire. The Governor of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa administers 
the areas as an agent of the President of Pakistan. However, in practice, the tribal areas 
are governed by tribal customary law and practices. The efforts of the administration in 
Islamabad to establish the rule of law in the tribal areas or to provide services are weak and 
at times resisted by the locals. An example of this are the difficulties faced by health work-
ers in administering polio vaccines in north and south Waziristan, dooming the region to 
be one of the last places on earth still plagued by polio.
A mosaic of jihadist groups
The restless Afghanistan-Pakistan border has been the heartland of jihadism for over 
17 years. After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, both Taliban and al-Qaida fighters 
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retreated to the mountains to wage war against the fledgling government in Kabul and 
its foreign supporters led by NATO. One of the better-known foreign fighter groups that 
has nested itself into the borderlands is the Central Asian group, the Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan (IMU), which has strong connections to al-Qaida. Perhaps the most well-
known jihadist group in the area is the Haqqani network, which has specialized in high-
profile terror attacks against Western and Indian interests in Kabul [5]. For example, they 
are thought to be responsible for the massive 31 May 2018 attack in Kabul, which caused 
extensive damage to the German embassy. The Haqqanis are considered to be operating 
under the directives and protection of Pakistan’s military intelligence, also known as Inter-
Services Intelligence or ISI (see [6] for an in-depth account of the history of ISI). 
In addition, many other jihadist groups can be found in the Afghanistan-Pakistan 
borderlands (see for example [7] and [8]). These include such groups as the Tora Bora 
Jihadi Front, Fedayi Karwan, the Siaspushan fighters, al-Qaida, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP), Laskkar-e Islam, Jamaat ul-Ahrar, Junud-e Khorasan and Amr bil Ma’ruf wa Nahi 
an al-Munkar. 
All of these groups share a radical Islamist worldview. For the radical, Islamism is both 
a political ideology and the religious belief that all political power rests with Allah. The 
groups all seek to implement sharia, but their understanding of what it entails varies. It is 
often infused with local customary law and beliefs. For all the jihadist groups, the adminis-
trations in Kabul and Islamabad represent apostate regimes. The administration in Kabul is 
particularly problematic as in the view of the jihadists it is propped up by foreign infidels.
The shaky government of national unity
The present government of national unity (NUG) is best seen as a coalition that rests on 
a Pashtun/Uzbek pillar of support around President Ashraf Ghani and a Tajik/Hazara pillar 
of support around Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Abdullah Abdullah. The NUG came into 
existence after extremely difficult and highly contested presidential elections in 2014. The 
position of CEO is a result of a compromise regarding the electoral impasse and essentially 
a kind of quasi-prime-ministerial post with more managerial than executive powers. De-
spite many shortcomings, the NUG can be considered an achievement of sorts, especially if 
the alternative was outright prolonged violence between the two contesting camps. 
The NUG is very much an elite political deal, although it can be seen as more inclu-
sive than the previous administration of Hamid Karzai. Nonetheless, two years after the 
formation of the NUG, the exact role of the CEO is still unclear. President Ghani is often 
accused of micro-management and the over-centralization of powers to the presidential 
palace, which leaves the CEO on the margins of decision-making processes. It is no sur-
prise that the NUG is rife with arguments, disagreements, deep mistrust and mutual sus-
picion, not only between the president and the CEO but also between the supporting 
camps of the two leaders. The supporting camps fuel the incessant disagreements over 
appointments, management styles and reform agendas. There are fundamental disagree-
ments on how the elections went, why the NUG came into being, and what it means for 
the balance of power and legitimacy of the partnership. Since the NUG represents a fragile 
balance between many players and interests, it is hardly capable of delivering the vari-
ous ambitious governance, economic and electoral reforms it has set for itself (see [9] for 
a brief overview of the history of the NUG).
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To complicate matters further, in addition to the Taliban there are powerful former 
government officials and ministers who have a warlord background and who form a strong 
opposition to the NUG and its reform agenda. This opposition bloc is at times referred 
to as the ‘Jihadi Council’. The persistent political uncertainty continues to undermine 
private-sector confidence and affect economic activity in Afghanistan. The interaction 
among rogue government elements, their political patrons and networks, drug traffickers 
and insurgents perpetuates an ongoing cycle of violence, extremism and corruption.
The international community present in Kabul, particularly the United Nations As-
sistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), the US and the EU become extremely con-
cerned every time a disagreement between the president and the CEO is brought into 
public arenas. The US, EU and UN envoys seek meetings with the two leaders and their 
supporting camps in an effort to defuse the situation and prevent it from escalating be-
yond repair. This state of affairs is indicative of the fact that the NUG was built on shaky 
ground, and since 2014 there has been a real danger that if push comes to shove, the weak 
coalition government will tumble, leaving the international community with a dilemma 
over who would then be the legitimate interlocutor and representative to engage with. 
The political situation will become even more confusing in the near future as the 
country is gearing up for parliamentary and presidential elections. As of March 2018 it is 
unclear when the elections will be held or whether the technical preparations needed for 
them will be completed in time. Of more importance, however, is the highly problematic 
security situation as it will be very difficult to set up polling stations in many parts of the 
country that are de facto controlled by the Taliban and other jihadist groups.
Security situation in a steady downward spiral
Despite the massive input invested in stabilizing the country by the NATO-led 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and subsequent Resolute Support (RS) 
mission, the security situation in Afghanistan remains extremely fluid. The control of 
whole districts frequently changes hands between the government forces and the Tali-
ban insurgents. The insurgency does not show any signs of abating. According to some 
estimates, approximately one-third of the country is in the hands of the government, 
40 percent is controlled by the Taliban, while the remaining third is a contested no man’s 
land [10]. Other reports contend that 70 percent of the territory is actually in the hands 
of insurgents [11].
The temporary loss of Kunduz to the Taliban in the autumn of 2015 was disastrous 
for the Afghan government. Kunduz is one of the major hubs in northern Afghanistan 
and the very fact that it fell to the insurgents was symbolically a tremendous blow to the 
government. Although Afghan security forces recaptured the city after heavy fighting, the 
damage to the credibility of the government as a security provider had already been done. 
With the onset of the 2016 fighting season, Lashgar Gah in the south was almost overrun 
by insurgents, forcing the UK and US to deploy special forces and advisors to an area from 
which they withdrew with much fanfare at the end of 2014, having ‘accomplished the mis-
sion’. As of late October 2017, the Taliban were on the verge of overrunning many other 
district centres.
Northern Afghanistan, which was previously considered to be a relatively stable 
region, has seen government control shrink by a drastic 60 percent within the space of 
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two to three years. From a regional security policy perspective, it appears as if a decision 
has been made that only the triangle between the cities of Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz and 
Pholi-i-Kumri is worth defending. Incidentally, the only road between this strategic tri-
angle and the capital, Kabul, is frequently cut off by ambushes. The provinces to the east, 
namely Takhar and Badakshan, and to the west, namely Faryab and Jawzjan, appear to 
be written off as strategically unimportant. It is worth noting that during the ISAF years 
these very provinces were patrolled by German and Norwegian troops. 
The situation in the north is symptomatic of the larger dynamics at play in Afghani-
stan. One by one, district capitals are either overrun by insurgents and/or the Afghan 
security forces abandon them by pulling back to ‘strategically more significant’ areas. It is 
worth noting that many of the so-called government-held areas amount to very little in 
the first place. In fact, at times, a lone police HQ or district governor’s office with a tattered 
flag fluttering in the wind behind barbed wire and a defensive perimeter has been denoted 
as government-held territory. The immediate vicinity of such compounds is controlled 
day and night by the insurgency. While the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) may 
succeed in winning individual battles, they are unable to hold onto territory for prolonged 
periods of time. 
There is also evidence of local deals struck by the insurgents and lone Afghan Na-
tional Army (ANA) garrisons in Taliban-held territory that neither will attack the other. 
The Taliban are left to operate in broad daylight and govern the areas under their control, 
and they are ready to leave the garrisons in peace as long as the ANA do not venture out-
side their bases. The overall grip of the government will gradually erode to the point where 
most of the districts and even urban centres, with the exception of a few major cities and 
the capital, will remain outside government control. Within Kabul itself, a “Green Zone” 
has been established where the international community and key government institu-
tions, such as the presidential palace and the foreign ministry, are hunkered down behind 
massive blast walls, checkpoints and barbed wire. 
To complicate matters further, the current conflict is not only about the fight for ter-
ritory and power between the Taliban insurgents and the Ghani-Abdullah government. In 
addition, local powerbrokers, warlords and narco-traffickers have stakes in the conflict. At 
times, it is a fight for control of local turf and communities, and at other times, a fight for 
control of lucrative resources such as opium and/or minerals, oil and gas or gemstones. 
Interestingly enough, at times, this state of affairs does not really matter to the local people 
as they do not really care who is in control as long as they are left in peace. It is the civilians 
who bear the brunt of the conflict. From the viewpoint of civilian protection, 2017 was 
tragic as it was a year in which UNAMA recorded 10,453 civilian casualties (3,438 deaths 
and 7,015 injured) [12].
In August 2017 President Donald Trump unveiled a new policy for Afghanistan that 
was part of a larger South Asia strategy. New emphasis was placed on training Afghan 
army special forces and equipping the Afghan air force to better deal with the insurgency. 
This may well boost the morale of the government forces, but if ISAF with all its assets 
could not turn the tide of war, it is questionable as to whether the much weaker Afghan 
army will be able to do it. Nevertheless, the point worth noting is that for the first time 
Washington sent strong public messages to Pakistan to stop supporting terror networks 
such as the Haqqanis to destabilize the situation over the border. It remains to be seen how 
this policy will affect the course of the war in the future. 
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Nevertheless, tracking trends in security has become more difficult, as more areas 
suffering conflict have become inaccessible and those fighting  — both Afghan and in-
ternational forces — less transparent. According to Ruttig, the Afghan war became more 
violent and widespread in 2017 [13]. It is unlikely that this will change for the better in the 
near future.
Enter ISIS
A new player that entered the scene in the jihadist mosaic of the Afghanistan-Paki-
stan border lands was ISIS, or Daesh as it is better known locally (see [14] for details of 
how ISIS established a presence in Nangahar). The Taliban movement’s grip on power in 
the borderlands has always been slightly weaker than in the Taliban heartland of Kanda-
har. In addition, many of the leaders of the other jihadist groups changed in 2015. ISIS was 
able to exploit the confusion and bring to its fold many Taliban and other jihadist fighters 
that were unhappy with their own leadership.
Many were Afghans who had left to fight with al-Nusra in Syria and subsequently 
came back home. Furthermore, many former TTP members from Pakistan who were flee-
ing military operations conducted by the Pakistani army joined the ranks of ISIS. The 
military wing of the Taliban, that is the Peshawar shura and the Haqqani network, formed 
an alliance with ISIS. The political wing of the Taliban, namely the Quetta shura, did not 
join the cooperation pact, however, as they did not want to pledge allegiance to the ISIS 
leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Nevertheless, in January 2015  ISIS declared the birth of the Islamic State of Kho-
rasan Province IS-KP. At first, the National Directorate of Security (NDS) even encour-
aged the presence of ISIS in the borderlands as a counter-force against the Taliban. In the 
beginning, IS-KP did not attack government forces and facilities, but the situation quickly 
changed in the summer of 2015, and ever since then there have been constant violent 
exchanges between them. IS-KP has conducted a number of high-profile attacks in Kabul 
against Shia mosques and government, Western and Indian interests. IS-KP was even able 
to penetrate the well-fortified Green Zone and conduct a suicide attack killing a number 
of civilians in late 2017. By attacking Shia mosques, IS-KP is trying to bring sectarianism 
into Afghanistan. The Taliban strongly condemned these attacks.
Bellum omnium contra omnes
The co-existence of IS-KP and the Taliban soon turned sour. IS-KP was not content 
to be yet another actor on the battlefield, but wanted to gain more territory and establish 
a strong foothold in areas that had traditionally been under the rule and/or influence of 
the Taliban movement. IS-KP also declared itself to be ‘the one and only true’ representa-
tive of Islam. IS-KP fighters committed brutal acts of violence and the public executions 
of village elders and some local Taliban leaders caused the local population to turn away 
from IS-KP. There were increasing violent exchanges between IS-KP and Taliban forces 
particularly in eastern Nangahar and parts of Kunar.
As a result of the conflict between the two jihadist groups, the borderlands witnessed 
not only a conflict between Afghan security forces and the Taliban, but also a conflict 
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among all three sides. There are also a number of pro-government militias fighting in the 
borderlands. The most notorious example is the militia of the former deputy speaker of 
Wolesi Jirga (the Lower House of the Afghan Parliament), Haji Zahir Qadir. His forces 
killed a number of IS-KP fighters and put their heads on display in Achin district, Nan-
gahar [15].
The Pakistani Taliban (TTP) has not fought IS-KP, and their relationship on the Paki-
stan side of the border is better than the situation on the Afghan side. One of the reasons 
for this is that TTP is a loose alliance of jihadist groups and they lack a structured chain of 
command as is the case with the Afghan Taliban. In addition, the Persian Gulf supporters 
of TTP do not appreciate infighting amongst jihadist groups in Pakistan when the goal is 
to overthrow what they consider to be an apostate regime in Islamabad.
The future of jihadist groups in the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands
The future of the various jihadist groups, be they the Taliban, IS-KP, TTP or other 
smaller groups, appears promising. The administration in Kabul is steadily losing ground 
against the jihadists, not only in the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands, but across the 
country. The upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections will result in further con-
fusion and political paralysis.
Islamabad, on the other hand, has not been able to pacify the restless FATA region. 
Despite a joint military offensive launched in June 2014 (operation Zarb-e-Azb) by the 
Pakistani army in North Waziristan against various militant groups, the jihadist scene 
in Pakistan is still going strong. There was a decrease in violence and terrorist attacks for 
a period of time following clearance operations, but Pakistan has again witnessed a resur-
gence of terrorist incidents. The tribal region attracts new jihadist groups that are emerg-
ing from the various splinter groups of TTP and others. In addition, the region is a haven 
for foreign fighters such as IMU and al-Qaida-linked operatives.
As Rashid points out, the problem in Pakistan is that the Pakistani leadership has al-
lowed the jihadist groups to grow on their own home turf in order to use them as proxies 
against India, the Western interests in Afghanistan, and the Afghan government [16]. This 
is now backfiring badly and the prospect of a stable and democratic Pakistan seems ever 
more unlikely. 
On the Afghan side of the border, it appears that the Taliban and IS-KP have come 
to some form of understanding, and a truce between them is holding for now. As the Ca-
liphate crumbled in Iraq and Syria, the central leadership of ISIS in the Middle East lost 
sway over the local forces in Afghanistan. In a pattern typical of jihadist group dynamics, 
IS-KP also split into two rival camps. This led IS-KP to mend fences with the Pakistani 
authorities and the Taliban political leadership in Quetta (see [17] for details).
The Taliban have always regarded IS-KP (and other jihadist groups for that matter) 
as a distraction from their main aim of fighting the Afghan government. Hence, they have 
sought to quell the fighting between the Taliban and IS-KP forces. Yet there is evidence 
from other parts of Afghanistan such as Helmand, Farah, Zabul and Logar, where some 
dissident ex-Taliban commanders have shifted allegiance to ISIS, that the Taliban leader-
ship has sought to re-gain control from ISIS-affiliated contenders. A curious exception can 
be found in Jawzjan province where two districts are (for now) under an ISIS-affiliated 
commander [18].
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The fact that there are constant violent border skirmishes between the Afghan army 
and Pakistani army forces further undermines the already weak government presence in 
the borderlands. As the two armies waste resources confronting each other, the jihadist 
groups are able to take advantage of the chaos and further strengthen their foothold in the 
borderlands.
The prognosis for the Afghan-Pakistan borderlands appears bleak. The vicious cycle 
of violence continues and the entrenched jihadist groups revel in the chaos caused by the 
failure of central governments on both sides of the border to establish the rule of law and 
provide services for the local populations. It appears that the borderlands that have always 
been beyond the control of central governments will continue to be ungoverned spaces 
for a long time to come, in very much the same way as the British discovered the case to 
be in the early 19th century. Interference and attempts to exercise control by outsiders, be 
they local Kabul or Peshawar elites, foreigners some 180 years ago, or the current admin-
istrations in Kabul and the foreign supporters of the Afghan government in contemporary 
times, have come to nothing thus far. Disturbingly, the view from Islamabad towards the 
frontier does not look any better.
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